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DEFINING INTERROGATION U N D E R M I R A N D A : 
Arizona v. Mauro* 
I . INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court has continuously attempted to 
define the scope of allowable police interrogation practices. One 
question that frequently arises is whether particular police conduct 
amounts to interrogation within the meaning of Miranda v. Ari-
zona} The Court recently confronted this issue in Arizona v. 
Mauro.2 In Mauro, the Court held that a defendant was not inter-
rogated within the meaning of Miranda when police allowed his 
wife to speak with him in the presence of an officer who tape-re-
corded their conversation. This Note will assess Mauro in light of 
the Court's prior decisions. 
I I . BACKGROUND 
A. Miranda v. Arizona 
In Miranda v. Arizona,3 the Court formulated the now familiar 
procedural safeguards to secure the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion. The prosecution may not use statements stemming from custo-
dial interrogations of a suspect, unless it demonstrates that the de-
fendant waived his Miranda rights.4 Thus, when a suspect in 
custody requests counsel, all interrogation must cease until an attor-
ney is present.5 Whether particular police conduct amounts to inter-
rogation for Miranda purposes, however, can be answered only on a 
case-by-case basis. 
B. Rhode Island v. Innis 
In Rhode Island v. Innis,9 the Court held that interrogation re-
fers to more than express questioning by the police.7 In Innis, the 
police arrested the defendant for the shotgun slaying of a taxicab 
driver. After arresting him, the police advised the defendant of his 
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Miranda rights. The defendant responded that he understood, and 
that he wished to speak with his lawyer. While transporting the 
defendant to the police station, two of the arresting officers engaged 
in a conversation indicating that there were many handicapped chil-
dren in the area where the police thought the murder weapon was 
hidden. Upon hearing the conversation, the defendant directed the 
officers to the weapon.8 
The Supreme Court ruled that the defendant had not been inter-
rogated within the meaning of Miranda ® The Court ruled that Mi-
randa applies only when there is direct questioning or its functional 
equivalent.10 The functional equivalent is words or actions on the 
part of the police that they know are reasonably likely to elicit an 
incriminating response.11 In determining whether police conduct 
constitutes interrogation, the Court stated that it is necessary to 
look at both the police intent and the suspect's perceptions of police 
actions.12 
The Court then applied its test to the facts of Innis. The Court 
found that the defendant's response was not the product of words or 
conduct that the police "should have known were reasonably likely 
to elicit an incriminating response."13 The troubling aspect of the 
Innis decision is that "[i]t is wholly unclear whether the Court's 
interrogation standard was actually based on the perceptions of the 
suspect or of a reasonable person in the suspect's position or upon 
the perceptions of a reasonable police officer or of the particular 
officer involved."14 In Mauro, the Court attempted to resolve this 
uncertainty.16 
III. Arizona v. Mauro 
A. Facts and Case History 
In Mauro, the defendant was arrested for beating his infant son 
to death. After the police advised him of his Miranda rights, he 
indicated that he did not want to answer any questions, and that he 
wanted to see a lawyer. Because no detention area was available, 
the police placed the defendant in the police captain's office. The 
8 Id. at 294-95. 
9 Id. at 301. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 302. 
14 Sonershein, Miranda and the Burger Court: Trends and Countertrends, 13 LOY. U. 
CHI. L. J. 404, 438 (1982). The Innis Court, however, noted that "this definition focuses 
primarily upon the perceptions of the suspect, rather than the intent of the police." Innis, 
446 U.S. at 301. 
15 The Court in Mauro specifically stated that the Arizona Supreme Court's decision 
"appeared to misconstrue our decision in Rhode Island v. Innis." Arizona v. Mauro, 107 
S. Ct. 1931, 1934 (1987). 
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defendant's wife, also at the station, then indicated that she wished 
to speak with her husband. The police were reluctant to let the 
meeting take place, but they finally allowed it on the condition that 
an officer be present. Using a recorder placed in plain sight, an of-
ficer taped the conversation. At trial, the government used the tape 
to rebut the defendant's insanity defense.16 
The Arizona Supreme Court held that the police had violated the 
defendant's fifth amendment rights. The court concluded that the 
police had indirectly interrogated the defendant within the meaning 
of Miranda, because they intended to elicit incriminating informa-
tion. Having found that the officers acted with intent, the court 
deemed it unnecessary to address the defendant's perceptions. The 
United States Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice 
Powell, reversed the Arizona Supreme Court.17 
B. United States Supreme Court 
The Court held that the police conduct did not amount to the 
functional equivalent of interrogation.18 The Court based its deci-
sion on the two factors discussed in Innis. First, the officers never 
intended to elicit incriminating statements from the defendant.19 
The mere possibility that the defendant might incriminate himself 
was not equivalent to an attempt by the officers to elicit incriminat-
ing statements.20 Second, the Court looked to the defendant's per-
ceptions to see whether "he would feel that he was being coerced 
into incriminating himself,"21 and found that the defendant was not 
subjected to compelling influences, psychological ploys, or the type 
of direct questioning that Miranda was designed to protect 
against.22 The Court doubted that a suspect, when told that his wife 
wanted to speak to him, would feel in any way that he was being 
coerced into incriminating himself.23 
The fundamental purpose of Miranda, which is to prevent gov-
ernment officials from using the coercive nature of confinement to 
extract confessions, guided the Court's holding in Mauro.24, The 
Court concluded that the officers' treatment of the defendant sim-
ply did not offend Miranda's purpose.26 
16 Mauro, 107 S. Ct. at 1932-33. 
17 Id. at 1934. 
18 Id. 
19 Id. at 1936. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
28 Id. 
24 Id. at 1936-37. 
28 Id. at 1937. 
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IV . ANALYSIS 
In Mauro, the Court attempted to clarify the Innis test. In deter-
mining whether police conduct constituted interrogation, the Court 
focused on two essential factors.26 First, the Court looked to 
whether or not the government's purpose was to elicit an incrimi-
nating response; and second, whether the suspect actually felt that 
he was being coerced into making an incriminating response.27 
A. Police Intent 
In Mauro, the Court noted that the mere possibility that a sus-
pect may incriminate himself is not equivalent to an affirmative po-
lice intent to elicit an incriminating response.28 Thus, a police of-
ficer may hope that a suspect will incriminate himself without 
actually intending to elicit an incriminating response. The problem 
with this reasoning, however, is that the focus is subjective, based 
solely on the intent of the particular officer involved.29 Under the 
Court's subjective view, an officer may merely explain that he was 
hoping to elicit an incriminating statement without actually in-
tending for the suspect to incriminate himself. Thus, relying solely 
on a subjective standard will open police interrogation practices to 
abuse. 
Police abuse will be significantly alleviated by supplementing the 
subjective analysis with an objective standard for evaluating police 
intent. Under an objective test, if a reasonable person would infer 
that the officer's actions were designed to elicit an incriminating 
response, then the police activity would constitute "interrogation."30 
Adding an objective element to the analysis would not change the 
result in Mauro, but would substantially reduce the potential for 
police abuse. 
B. Suspect's Perspective 
The other consideration is the suspect's perspective. An interro-
gation should not be deemed coercive unless a suspect in fact feels 
coerced. It is clear from the Mauro opinion that the Court used a 
subjective standard in determining that Mauro did not perceive that 
26 Id. at 1936. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Detective Manson, the officer present at the conversation, testified that there were 
other legitimate reasons — not related to securing incriminating information — for having 
a police officer present. Id. at 1936. These included a concern for the protection of Mrs. 
Mauro. They were also concerned that Mauro and his wife might "cook up a lie or swap 
statements with each other that shouldn't have been allowed, and whether some escape 
attempt might have been made, or whether there might have been an attempt to smuggle 
in a weapon." Id. at 1933. 
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he was being coerced.31 A subjective analysis alone, however, 
presents the same problems as when determining police intent. 
A more reasonable approach would be to supplement the subjec-
tive analysis with an objective standard for evaluating a suspect's 
perspective. Under an objective test, if a reasonable person would 
feel interrogated, then the police action would constitute "interroga-
tion." Adding an objective element would not change the result in 
Mauro, but would alleviate the need to rely solely on a suspect's 
self-serving testimony. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Although a subjective-objective analysis of both police intent and 
a suspect's perspective in determining whether interrogation occurs 
would undoubtedly enhance a suspect's fifth amendment protection, 
it probably exceeds the fundamental principles of Miranda. A bet-
ter test that is consistent with Miranda would be for the Court to 
focus solely on a suspect's perspective and apply an objective stan-
dard. An objective evaluation of a suspect's perspective would be 
fully responsive to Miranda because it would identify the situations 
in which a suspect experiences the functional equivalent of direct 
questioning.32 Police intent is relevant only to the broader policy of 
deterring bad faith police conduct, not to Miranda's more limited 
purpose of prohibiting coercive custodial interrogations. Thus, an 
objective evaluation of a suspect's perceptions alone would ade-
quately protect a suspect's fifth amendment rights. 
81 Arizona v. Mauro, 107 S. Ct. 1931, 1936 (1987). 
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